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irst I would like to thank Hellmut Eggers 
for his thoughtful comments on my paper. 
I hope we can collaborate on the project we 
both hold dear, improving evaluation of 
development aid! I am particularly grateful for 
the opportunity to reply to his comments. 
Given the wealth of experience that they 
represent, they give me a chance to significantly 
deepen my own argument. I need to mention 
that when I received his missive I was in the 
process of responding to very helpful 
comments from two other anonymous 
reviewers. The text of my paper includes these 
responses, so it has a few changes from the one 
his comments address. Of course his comments 
also came to me anonymously, but I learned his 
identity in reading the articles he references (2.2) 
in this journal and in Evaluation. I will try to 
respond to the substance of these articles as 
they relate to my proposal, but I can hardly do 
them justice in these brief comments and I 
encourage the reader to consider them in full. 
 While Eggers agrees about the need to 
improve aid evaluation, he argues, first, that 
improvements should be oriented around his 
construct of Project Cycle Management (PCM) 
rather than by a focus on impacts and cost-
effectiveness. Second, he rejects the idea of a 
professional association on the accountants’ 
model, arguing instead that reforms should 
initially be organized by a network of university 
departments (Network Development 
Cooperation Evaluation, NDCE), which in turn 
would work out a proposal for a common 
action plan. I think these disagreements are 
based on two main differences in substance. 
First Eggers does not appear to accept that 
reforms need to alter the incentive environment 
facing development professionals, and second, 
based partly on ambiguities in my original 
paper, he misunderstands my idea of impact 
assessment, arguing instead for a kind of holistic 
approach to project analysis (PCM) making use 
of the logical framework and the DAC criteria. 
 Eggers agrees that the structure of 
development assistance generates incentives for 
positive bias in evaluations, but he argues from 
his own experience as head of the evaluation 
division of the EU Commission Directorates 
General for Development and for External 
Affairs that these incentives can be resisted 
(2.1). While I am happy to concede the specific 
point, I do not think his individual probity 
undermines my argument. Generally 
development agencies face competing pressures 
in regard to evaluation. On one hand the idea of 
professionalism in development management 
cannot be sustained without some role for 
evaluation. At the level of the organization it is 
clear that evaluation is needed for learning if not 
for accountability, so anyone who is committed 
to development finds themselves committed to 
evaluation.  On the other hand, when someone 
is directly responsible for an intervention they 
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are likely to have mixed feelings about 
evaluations over which they have no control. 
These feelings may be heightened when things 
have gone less well than originally expected. 
Add that perceptions of poor results may 
undermine subsequent access to resources at all 
organizational levels, and what starts as an 
individual misgiving is likely to turn into an 
institutional pattern (although a determined 
individual at the top may well be able to swim 
against the stream). 
 My paper also argues that development 
assistance lacks the structural accountability of 
the market and of the electorate, and that the 
demands that international development places 
on learning are particularly great. Evaluation 
International represents a structural response to 
a structural problem. The structural nature of 
this response depends on the definition of 
“impacts” (as well as on the role of the 
standards committee), so Eggers’ 
misunderstanding of my view here contributes 
to the differences in our perspectives. In fact 
the “master principle” of Eggers’ PCM (2002, p. 
499; 2006, p. 44) parallels the role of impacts in 
my proposal. His first principle states, “the 
specific objective (or the purpose) of 
development projects, programmes and policies 
must always be expressed in terms of 
sustainable benefits for the target group” (2002, 
pp. 498-499). Then Project Cycle Management 
revolves around securing these benefits. My 
definition of impacts, which is widely held in 
the development community but which I 
neglected to state in the original paper, is 
“changes in the conditions of impactees 
compared to the situation one would expect in 
the absence of the intervention.” Once Eggers 
interpreted my view of “impacts” in the logical 
framework tradition, as “mak[ing] sure the 
specific objective, once reached, will contribute 
to the wider objectives of the development 
policy pursued” (plus some element of 
achieving the project purpose; 2.4), it is not 
surprising that he was less than convinced by 
my overall proposal. 
 As I hope my paper now makes clear, EI 
evaluators will be expected to estimate and sum 
together all the main impacts attributable to an 
intervention, past and future, quantitative and 
qualitative, intended and unintended, which are 
legitimately important to any stakeholder, even 
in the absence of evidence generated with 
experimental or quasi-experimental designs. 
Also, my “cost-effectiveness” expresses the 
relative magnitudes of total impacts and total 
costs; it is not the lowest cost means of 
achieving objectives, as Eggers seems to have it 
(2.5). My “maximizing impacts” is roughly 
equivalent to Eggers’ “sustainable benefits for 
the target group,” except it allows for benefits 
that are highly subsidized and hence not 
sustainable in the ordinary sense of the term but 
that may nevertheless be cost-effective. 
Estimates of impacts and of cost-effectiveness, 
in turn, provide a basis for accountability that I 
do not find in PCM, as evaluators trace the 
reasons for high or low cost-effectiveness back 
to project design and implementation. And it is 
the expectation of accountability that alters the 
incentives facing development managers.  Now 
they will anticipate that their strong 
management will be rewarded and their weak 
management penalized. 
 The second and third principles of Eggers’ 
PCM are: 
 
2. all of the essential criteria for successful 
project/programme preparation, 
implementation, and evaluation, that 
experience teaches us, should be 
considered; and 
3. there should be sound decision-making 
discipline all along the 
project/programme cycle (2002, p. 500). 
 
The second principle involves things like doing 
a needs assessment and working out a strong 
logical framework. Eggers is arguing that certain 
standard management systems should be 
maintained (which is not as easy as it sounds), 
and I agree. However my proposal generates an 
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additional source of motivation, beyond the 
innate desire to do good, for their effective 
application. His third principle specifically 
addresses political pressures, on both the donor 
and recipient side, that are often found to be 
responsible for weak project management. “It 
may not be easy to convince political decision 
makers to change their ways and to put target 
group interests first,” Eggers writes, “But it is 
not impossible” (2002, p. 500). It seems to me 
not too cynical to think that political decision 
makers generally are and will continue to be 
conditioned to view aid politically. EI aims to 
establish counter-incentives, if you will, to help 
development agencies to build management 
systems and cultures that can generally maintain 
a focus on maximizing impacts (or sustainable 
project benefits) despite political pressures. 
 My entire proposal depends, however, on 
EI evaluators actually being able to make 
estimates of impacts and cost-effectiveness that 
are good enough to provide a reliable basis for 
accountability (as well as for learning). Their 
knowledge of the literature on the relevant 
sector and of evaluations of similar 
interventions (sometimes including evaluations 
with experimental designs) will help them to 
draw inferences from evidence they glean from 
project records and from their own direct 
investigations. We should also note that even 
impact estimates that are somewhat imprecise 
may still provide a reliable basis for learning and 
accountability. I agree with Eggers that a large 
part of EI’s guidebook should be drawn from 
existing sources, but EI will need to go further 
particularly in developing principles and 
conventions for making impact estimates. On 
one hand these principles and conventions will 
help to make impact estimates more reliable and 
precise. On the other hand they and the 
standards committee that defends them offer 
protection from positive bias, anchoring EI 
evaluators’ independence. 
 If impact estimates in all EI evaluations are 
consistent with the same set of principles and 
conventions, this will render the estimates 
consistent also with one another, so they 
provide a stronger basis for learning and for 
accountability. Eggers argues that PCM too 
provides a basis for consistency (2.2), but it is 
only consistency in management systems and in 
questions asked. The closest approximation in 
established practice to the analysis of impacts 
and cost-effectiveness that I propose is found in 
economic rate of return (ERR) analysis. While 
ERR analysis has been applied to development 
projects for at least 50 years, it has had no 
institutional defense or basis for consistency 
such as EI offers, and the majority of ERR 
estimates that I have seen for completed 
projects (when I have also seen the underlying 
analysis) have appeared to me to be positively 
biased. 
 I think that most of Eggers’ complaints 
against my conceptions of impacts and cost-
effectiveness (2.5) are addressed now that I have 
explained them more clearly. They pretty much 
cover economy, effectiveness, efficiency, 
sustainability, and impact as in his presentation 
of the DAC criteria (2006, p. 40). However he 
also argues that I miss the remaining DAC 
criterion, “relevance,” and that it should be 
included. Eggers defines relevance as “tackl[ing] 
problems that are worthwhile to be solved” 
(2006, p. 40) and as “[s]olving the problems the 
target group faces” (2.6), not (as some have 
done) in terms of consistency with donor and 
government strategies. While establishing 
relevance is an important part of planning, my 
reply to Eggers is that from the point of view of 
evaluation, impacts and cost-effectiveness 
adequately cover the territory of relevance as 
well. Since we presume that positive impacts are 
“goods,” any intervention that has substantial 
and highly cost-effective impacts must have 
been relevant, even if these impacts were not 
high on the beneficiary population’s stated list 
of priorities when the intervention began. For 
example, members of a particular community 
may not say that they place a high value on 
improving children’s health (perhaps due to 
fatalism), or on increasing girls’ education or 
Paul Clements 




women’s empowerment, but impacts in these 
areas are still important. Donors sometimes may 
value delivering benefits to the poor (rather 
than, say, to local elites) more highly than 
beneficiary communities do. Since donors 
provide the resources, and since evaluation 
serves learning and accountability first for 
donors (and for the implementing agencies they 
fund), it is their values that should weight 
impacts for calculating cost-effectiveness. The 
views of beneficiary communities must of 
course be taken into account in project 
management. 
 Eggers has argued that EI is “way too 
bureaucratic” and expensive, and that scientific 
authority “cannot be ‘allotted’ to a newly 
established entity!” (2.8). I can only reply that I 
can think of no more efficient way to 
counterbalance incentives for positive bias and 
also to generate reliable and consistent estimates 
of impacts and cost-effectiveness in routine 
evaluations. I expect that due to their analytic 
rigor, EI evaluations will tend to be patently 
more helpful than most contemporary 
evaluations, as well as providing a stronger basis 
for accountability and for learning. Like any 
other management tool they should be judged 
by their cost-effectiveness, but it seems 
plausible that they could be highly cost-
effective. However the incentive effects that I 
have discussed only arise if managers expect 
that their intervention will be subject to an EI 
evaluation. The different features of EI work as 
a package, so the start-up costs are indeed 
significant. In making the comparison with 
associations of accountants I have noted that 
they “control entry to the profession” (2.10), 
but of course EI would only control entry to 
EI. EI should aspire to become the standard for 
aid evaluation for those interventions that are 
properly subject to impact assessment, 
acknowledging a distinct role for a small 
proportion of evaluations with experimental 
designs. But this is only an aspiration. While EI 
should collaborate with or possibly operate 
under the banner of an already established 
association (e.g. the International Development 
Evaluation Association, the American 
Evaluation Association), in fact no one is 
currently performing the functions that I have 
proposed for EI or for its standards committee, 
certainly not in the international development 
arena. 
 It is my hope, Hellmut Eggers, that this 
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